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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the effect of bank capital on lending expansion and contraction for 
nearly 150 years in Spain. We fi rst build up thoroughly a measure of bank leverage (i.e. the 
capital to assets ratio) for the Spanish banking sector starting in year 1880. Then, we run 
a proper econometric test to analyze the impact that bank capital levels have on lending 
cycles, controlling for other determinants of credit growth. We do fi nd robust empirical 
evidence of an asymmetric relationship between bank capital and credit cycle. In particular, 
an increase in the bank capital before expansions reduces credit growth while it increases 
credit growth when the recession arrives. Conversely, a too depleted level of bank capital 
when entering in a recession has a severe impact on lending (i.e. may bring about a deep 
credit crunch) with quite negative and lasting effects in the economy and the wellbeing of 
the society as a whole. The paper is particularly useful to support macroprudential policies 
(dynamic provisions and the countercyclical capital buffer) that have been very recently put 
in place as they will help to smooth the credit cycle. The experience of Spain over more 
than a century, with very marked lending cycles, provides a fertile ground for analyzing and 
supporting them, not only based on the last lending cycle, but also on those occurred in 
the more distant past.
Keywords: lending cycles, bank crisis, capital ratio, leverage ratio, macroprudential tools.
JEL classifi cation: G01, G21, N23, N24.
Resumen
En este estudio analizamos el efecto del capital bancario en las expansiones y 
contracciones crediticias durante alrededor de 150 años en España. Primero construimos 
cuidadosamente una medida de apalancamiento bancario (i. e., ratio de capital sobre 
activo) para el sector bancario español desde el año 1880. Después, llevamos a cabo un 
análisis econométrico sólido para analizar el impacto de los niveles de capital bancario 
sobre los ciclos crediticios, controlando por otros factores de crecimiento de crédito. 
Encontramos evidencia empírica robusta sobre la relación asimétrica entre el capital bancario 
y el ciclo crediticio. En particular, un aumento del capital bancario antes de una expansión 
reduce el crecimiento del crédito, mientras que lo aumenta cuando llega una recesión. Por 
el contrario, un nivel de capital demasiado menguado ante una recesión tiene un impacto 
severo sobre la actividad crediticia (i. e., se puede incurrir en una escasez de crédito) con 
efectos negativos y duraderos en la economía y el bienestar de la sociedad en su conjunto. 
El artículo es particularmente útil para apoyar políticas macroprudenciales (provisiones 
dinámicas y colchones de capital anticíclico) que han sido implementados recientemente 
para alisar el ciclo crediticio. La experiencia de España durante más de un siglo con ciclos 
crediticios muy marcados permite analizarlos y respaldarlos, no solo basándonos en el 
último ciclo crediticio, sino también en los ocurridos en un pasado más lejano.
Palabras clave: ciclos crediticios, crisis bancaria, ratio de capital, ratio de apalancamiento, 
herramientas macroprudenciales.
Códigos JEL: G01, G21, N23, N24.
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has shown the impact that bank failures and/or bank 
recapitalizations may have on the economy and the society as a whole.2 The international 
banking crisis that hit the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and many other 
developed countries has had a long and lasting impact on the economy, the level of 
employment and the distribution of income, with some ripples reaching also the political 
arena. 
Policy makers and regulators opened soon after the crisis’s most acute phase a soul search 
process trying to understand and amend what went wrong at banks before the crisis. As a 
result, the G-20 mandated the newly renamed Financial Stability Board to look into the 
causes and remedies of the financial crisis. The Financial Stability Board in the subsequent 
years pushed for reforms in banking regulation and beyond (shadow banking, CCPs or central 
counterparties, derivatives, accounting paradigm, corporate governance, etc.).3 
One of the main empirical conclusions of bank regulators and supervisors together with 
policy makers after the crisis was that banks entered into it with a too low level of capital. 
Capital had been expanded, or even worse, returned to shareholders via buy-backs or higher 
dividend streams,4 at a lower path than risks in the previous lending expansion, partially 
based on the notion that credit risk was better measured and managed and less capital per 
unit of exposure was needed. The spread and strength of the banking crisis showed quite 
clearly the weaknesses in that approach that, at a regulatory level, underpinned the Basel 2 
regulatory reforms, started in 1999 and concluded in 2004 (see BCBS (2004) and BCBS 
(2006) for a few additional changes before coming into force in 2008). 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Chart 1 in Estrada and Saurina (2016). 
3 See, among others, FSF (2009) as well as G-20 press releases to see the sense of urgency and the direction of 
the reforms. In particular, the one after the meeting in London in April 2009 (see G-20 press release (2009)) 
asked for a significant increase in bank capital, as well as for countercyclical buffers and better provisioning 
requirements. 
4 See Acharya et al. (2011) and Acharya et al. (2017) for an estimate of the importance of those buy-backs and 
dividend payments for the US banks.  
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Moreover, the financial crisis underlined the need to move from a pure microprudential view 
of capital requirements (i.e. focused only on the level of capital at each individual bank) to a 
more comprehensive or so-called holistic view of capital, where the macroprudential 
approach is also a key ingredient.5 That is, policy makers need to pay attention to how 
aggregate bank capital ratios evolve along the business cycle. Therefore, capital requirements 
need to have a countercyclical component, so that when the lending cycle is in full swing, 
banks need to reinforce the level of capital in order to help authorities to rein on the lending 
growth and the risk expansion, and even more importantly, build up a buffer to protect against 
future losses that may appear when the economy changes trend. The need for a higher level 
of capital at each bank, proportional to its risk, together with a countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB) for each bank, among other changes in capital, liquidity and systemic banks 
regulation, crystalized in the Basel 3 agreement (BCBS (2011)).  
There is a solid and robust empirical evidence of both the need for countercyclical tools 
(Jiménez and Saurina (2006)) and its usefulness to reduce credit crunches during recessions 
(Jiménez et al. (2017)). In particular, the latter article shows that a countercyclical tool based 
on dynamic provisions, which behaves very similarly to the current countercyclical capital 
requirement in Basel 3, had an impact on reducing the speed of lending growth in Spain 
during the last lending boom and, more importantly, reduced the credit contraction when the 
economy turned sour. Those banks with a higher dynamic provision buffer just before the 
crisis reduced lending significantly less than the weakest banks in terms of capital levels. 
This is a crucial finding to support macroprudential policies.6 
The aim of this paper is to expand quite significantly the perspective, so that we can learn 
not only from the last lending boom and bust in Spain but also from quite a long list of 
previous ones. In fact, we start our analysis in 1880, almost a century and a half ago, in order 
to see whether the role of bank capital has been similar or not in terms of fostering and/or 
smoothening the credit contraction. Our aim is to find even more robust empirical evidence, 
                                                          
5 To understand the content of the macroprudential approach see, among others, Crocket (2000), Borio (2003), 
Hanson et al. (2011), and more recently IMF (2014), IMF-FSB-BIS (2016), Mencia and Saurina (2016) and 
BIS (2017).  
6 A more thorough analysis of dynamic provisions can be found at Saurina and Trucharte (2017) with a summary 
of the mechanism for policy makers in Saurina (2009). 
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now from an aggregate point of view, to support macroprudential policies for a 
heterogeneous array of countries and banking systems. We base our analysis on a long period 
of Spanish history where different banking environments were present (i.e. very different 
levels of banking concentration and competition, different economic policy environments, 
different institutional arrangements, etc.).  
We also follow here a long tradition of international analysis literature that has studied the 
potential role of bank capital in credit crunches (Bernanke and Lown (1991), Rajan (1994), 
Peek and Rosengren (1995), Berger and Bouwman (2013), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) and 
Vazquez and Federico (2015)) or during the whole lending cycle (see for instance, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) or Saurina and Shin (2012)). Our added value is that we do 
not only focus on one historical episode (such as the last lending boom and bust in Spain, the 
credit crunch in the US Eastern Coast States in the early 90’s, Japan in its last credit boom 
and long lasting credit bust, or the last financial crisis, now a decade old), but rather on a 
large number of lending booms and busts in a country particularly prone to them as well as 
for banking crisis, both systemic and bank idiosyncratic.7 An excellent narrative of banking 
crisis in Spain as well as their driving factors can be found in Martín-Aceña (2013). 
Additionally, our approach contributes to the literature by complementing that of Elliot et al. 
(2013) and Elliot (2014) in the sense that instead of analyzing different past policy decisions 
as potential macroprudential tools, we focus on one regulatory or policy instrument (i.e. bank 
capital level) and assess its role along many different credit cycles. 
Moreover, the paper has a second important contribution. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time that a long series of a bank capital ratio for the Spanish banking system is being 
elaborated. This allows us to compare the historical levels of capital ratios of the Spanish 
banking sector with, for instance, the ones for the US (Berger et al. (1995)) or the UK 
(Alessandri and Haldane (2009)), available for long time periods. The comparison is quite 
telling. As Martín-Aceña (2013) and others have convincingly insisted over time, the Spanish 
                                                          
7 Banks are usually more levered or indebted than non-financial companies. While capital over total assets may 
vary between half and one third in an industrial company, in a bank it can be as low as 10%, 5%, 3% or even 
less, as the financial crisis showed quite crudely. Therefore, a relatively small loss of value of their assets may 
wipe out completely their capital forcing them into bankruptcy. Historically, the capital over total assets ratio 
used to be much higher, as we show later in the paper. 
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banking developments and crisis, as well as many other developments in the economy and 
the political arena, are a reflection of international developments happening around the same 
time. Spain was not isolated from the world but rather connected to it more or less directly. 
Similarly, the level of bank capital along the last century and a half behaves quite in parallel 
with developments in the US and the UK.  
We find for Spain a much higher level of bank capital in the late XIX century than in current 
times. In fact, until the Spanish Civil War, this ratio was also higher in Spain than in US and 
UK, but in all the three countries a steady decline was observed until the early sixties resulting 
in a marked convergence. Unfortunately, the long bank capital series for Spain has a serious 
breakdown during and right after the years of the Civil War, due to lack of available data. 
Notice that throughout the paper we will use indistinctly equity and capital, although 
conceptually the first includes the second. 
During the last half a century, when Spain started to transform its economy from a quite 
significant agricultural country to, first, a more industrialized country and, finally, into a 
services oriented economy, the capital ratio was quite stable in a broader historical 
perspective, fluctuating roughly around 6% for most of the last 50 years, not far above the 
minimum level of the series the nearly last century and a half. 
Turning to the methodology used, we apply the state of the art analysis for estimating the 
relationship between bank capital levels and lending cycles. Following Bernanke and Lown 
(1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1995), we model aggregated credit growth as a function of 
macroeconomic determinants, including the level and evolution of bank capital, using a non-
linear model to endogenously distinguish between periods of high and low credit growth. 
During the years analyzed, there are a number of lending cycles, as well as banking crisis, 
that allow us to estimate the elasticity of credit to bank capital. The cycles identified concur 
quite well with the systemic financial crisis identified with narrative techniques in Martín-
Aceña (2013). 
Our findings show that the level of bank capital has an asymmetric effect in the credit cycle 
so that a high capital ratio in advance of a credit boom reduces credit growth; on the contrary, 
during the states of nature where credit growth is low or even negative, high capital ratios in 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1847
advance increase the average credit growth or cater for a lower contraction in credit. The 
former results are quite relevant from a policy point of view. They could be interpreted as if 
a countercyclical capital buffer would reduce the size of the expansion, and also the 
magnitude of the subsequent credit crunch. Banks need to deleverage less (i.e. to cut lending 
to the private sector) if they have accumulated a larger amount of capital during expansions. 
Conversely, a depletion of capital during the expansionary phases, leaves not only banks but 
also the economy to their own fate, as the recession hits borrowers and lenders and the latter 
do not have room of manoeuver to react, buffering the impact of credit on the real economy. 
Therefore, we find support for the usage of macroprudential tools (e.g. CCyB) in quite a 
different economic and banking environments along nearly a century and a half. Thus, in 
very different economic development stages and banking structures (with or without foreign 
banks, with more or less stringent regulation, with more or less oligopolistic structures), we 
do find support for countercyclical tools. This aggregated evidence complements the more 
granular-based evidence provided in Jiménez et al (2017), although only for the last boom 
and bust lending cycle. 
Thus, we detail in the next section how we construct the capital ratio variable and also the 
other variables used in this research. In the third section we present the methodological 
approach used and, in the fourth, our main empirical results. In the final section, we extract 
some conclusions. 
2. Databases and preview of the historical capital ratios 
It is somehow striking that there is not a long time series for an aggregate equity ratio in 
Spain; that is, there is no time series of bank capital over total assets that spans, say, several 
lending cycles. At least we have not been able to find it. Therefore, we have engaged into a 
building up process in order to elaborate the database. To fulfill that purpose, we had to 
combine information from several sources, not always initially compatible among them. 
Appendix 1 discusses the details more thoroughly. We are aware that these time-series will 
be substantially improved, but we consider that they could be, at least, a first good 
approximation as well as a good anchor for our empirical research. We do believe, therefore, 
this is an important contribution of this paper. 
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In the case of the banking system balance sheets, the departure point was the information 
available in Chapter 4 of the Banco de España Statistical Bulletin. From this source, the 
banking system’s homogeneous balance sheets are available from 1962 onwards. These 
balance sheets show the sum of banks and savings banks.8 We aggregate most of the assets 
and liabilities entries, as in previous years the available breakdown was much more reduced. 
In particular, we worked with three items from the asset side (credits, securities and other 
assets) and from the liability side (equity –capital plus reserves–, deposits and other 
liabilities). A breakdown of lending by industry or product (i.e. lending to households or 
firms) may be interesting but not needed for our research goals. The same happens with some 
capital components, as tier 1 and tier 2 instruments are quite recent. 
The information from 1952 to 1962 was also obtained from former Banco de España 
Statistical Bulletins and additionally, we use several Bank Bulletins of the bankers 
association to obtain Spanish banks’ balance sheet information from 1924 to 1935 and from 
1941 to 1958. For the period 1915-1924, we used the series constructed by Martín-Aceña in 
the following book: "Estadísticas históricas de España volumen II, siglos XIX-XX", by 
Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (2005). Finally, data up to 1914 were obtained from the 
book "La banca española en la Restauración II, datos para una historia económica" by Anes 
et al. (1974). 
However, for the common years in different Statistical Bulletins, Bank Bulletins and books, 
the aggregated balance sheets do not exactly match. At this point, we adopted a statistical 
approach instead of an accountant one to make them comparable. We considered that the 
higher the aggregation, the higher the compatibility among different databases. Thus, we 
enlarged backwards the most recent database using the corresponding growth rates of the 
older databases, and afterwards we introduced an adjustment in the different assets and 
liabilities entries to guarantee that they added up. All in all, we build a continuous series of 
                                                          
8 Savings banks were not as prominent as they have been since early 1990s, when they could start to open 
branches nationwide and they expanded quite significantly. On the contrary, for most of the period analyzed, 
commercial banks dominated the banking landscape in Spain as they were the main providers of funding for 
non-financial industrial firms and, therefore, were the main source of funds for the economic development.  
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values for total assets, total credit and equity, by joining the four sources mentioned 
previously.9 
Besides, in order to allow the scaling of all these variables and facilitate the empirical analysis 
that is presented below, it was necessary to backtrack two macroeconomic variables: nominal 
GDP and CPI (Consumer Price Index). Both variables were taken from the Spanish Statistical 
Bureau INE database and linked backwards using the growth rates contained in the book by 
Carreras and Tafunell (2005). Due to data constrains, we calculate the real GDP (and the rest 
of the real variables appearing in this paper) dividing nominal GDP over CPI. We 
acknowledge that using the GDP deflator would not modify significantly the results.  
Figure 1 presents10 the evolution of both total assets and equity of the Spanish banking system 
as a percentage over nominal GDP over the last 137 years. Besides, the shaded areas represent 
the systemic banking crisis identified in Martín-Aceña (2013). As it can be seen, total assets 
over GDP remained relatively stable since 1880 until 1915. Afterwards, they have shown a 
continued upward trend, only interrupted following systemic financial crisis happened. In 
fact, the maximum was reached just before the global financial crisis (around 2008, over 
300%) and the current decline has been the highest observed in this sample period, allowing 
to recover the levels of the beginning of the new millennium. 
Total banking assets as a percentage of GDP is a rough measure of the level of leverage or 
indebtedness of an economy, in particular for those economies, such the Spanish, where 
banks dominate the financial landscape and market funding is relatively low. Note then how 
different was the last lending boom and bust in Spain, with a substantial ramp up of 
households and firms leverage before the explosion, together with a quite impressive 
correction afterwards not yet finished. The increasing leverage of economic agents reflects a 
natural deepening of banking activities as the economy matures, but it could also be a source 
of financial fragility as the higher indebtedness of those agents reduces its resilience to 
economic and/or financial shocks. 
                                                          
9 In Appendix 1 we show the evolution of these variables from the different sources to assess the adequacy of 
the statistical approach adopted.   
10 All figures and tables are collected at the end of the main text. 
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The equity over GDP ratio has remained more stable. In fact, at the beginning of the sample 
period it represented around 5%, showing a downward trend until 1920 and recovering before 
the Civil War. Right after that period, it departed from a very low level (2.5%), recovering 
the previous century ceiling in 1970. Afterwards, a sustained increase has been observed. 
The visual inspection shows that this ratio has diminished during all the recorded systemic 
banking crisis apart form the last one, when it markedly increased. 
From a different perspective, the green line of Figure 2 shows the equity ratio over total assets 
in Spain. After reaching values over 50% at the end of the XIX century, it showed a 
noticeable decline, reaching values around 15% before the Civil War. This downward trend 
continued afterwards, registering a floor of 4% by 1962. The trend changed and became 
positive until 1990 where it recorded a maximum value (7.6%) value since 1946. Then, it 
recorded a significant decline until the global financial crisis. During this last crisis, opposite 
to the previous ones, an important increase in this ratio has been recorded, reaching levels 
not observed since the early forties. The increase in equity over total assets during the last 
banking crisis is the result of different factors. First of all, the increase in capital brought 
about by more stringent new regulation (i.e. enforcement of Basel 3). Secondly, it reflects 
the recapitalization with public funds of failed savings banks. Last but not least, it may also 
reflect the significant deleverage process (e.g. reduction of private indebtedness) that came 
after the banking and economic crisis, the worse in magnitude since the Civil War. 
Therefore, it seems that capital is being depleted during banking crisis as credit losses need 
to be absorbed. If those credit losses are large enough, given the low bank capital ratios 
already mentioned in the introductory section, they may end up causing the bankruptcy of 
the bank and, thus, forcing its exit of the market. This mechanism used to work in the distant 
past. Alternatively, banks can be recapitalized with public funds support, as the last three 
systemic banking crisis in Spain testify it, as well as in other developed countries. Note that 
the first two systemic banking crisis in our sample, those of the XIX century, implied a huge 
depletion of capital in relative terms, which never again was replenished.         
This chart also includes the historical evolution of similar ratios in the cases of the US (orange 
line) and the UK (blue line). As it can be seen, Spain had the highest ratio until the Civil War, 
followed by US and UK, converging the three of them by the mid-fifties and remaining less 
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volatile, probably associated to the first international initiatives to cooperate in banking 
regulation. After the Civil War and from a quantitative perspective, the Spanish equity ratio 
has been more similar to that of the UK. However, the three of them share a common 
diminishing trend until the 1950s. Afterwards, a period of stabilization or slight increase was 
observed, being followed by a reduction from mid-nineties, and an important increase right 
after the global financial crisis, as mentioned before. Benink and Benston (2005) also present 
a graph of several countries’ average capital ratio for a similar time span to ours. In common 
with our chart, they also display an almost constant evolution of the average capital ratio 
from the mid-fifties onwards, even if they consider a dissimilar basket of European countries. 
Further, Schularic and Taylor (2012) use a similar time span to ours as well about different 
countries (not exclusively European, as opposed to Benink and Benston (2005)), to reinforce 
the importance of credit cycles to determine the likelihood of financial crisis. They claim that 
credit booms gone wrong are very likely due to regulation deficiency.  
Finally, a few words on the composition of equity in this wide time period. Figure 3 captures 
the weight of reserves in total equity. As it can be seen, there exists a marked trend to rely on 
retained profits to increase equity in the banking system. The value of the ratio ranges from 
around 8% to around 95% and by the end of 2017 it was 77%. This variable does not seem 
to show a common trend during systemic financial crisis; it has increased in some of them, 
decreased in others, and even remained stable in some other. 
3. Methodological approach 
3.1.The model 
As the final objective of this paper is to shed light on banks’ equity’s role on preventing or 
exacerbating systemic financial crisis, following the previous literature (Claessens et al. 
(2012) or Jordá et al. (2016)), we have opted for estimating a credit to the non-financial 
private sector equation. Other possibilities widely used could be modelling housing or stock 
market prices (see Dupery and Klaus (2017) for a recent discussion on several property 
market variables’ effect on the probability of entering a financial stress regime).11  
                                                          
11 See Dembiermont et al. (2013) for a review of total and bank credit pattern for 40 countries since 1940. 
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This way, we will study the explanatory power of the equity ratio on credit, after controlling 
for the traditional determinants of credit (GDP, real interest rate, housing prices, deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium, among other). Bank capital should be included lagged, to 
avoid the possibility of endogeneity and more importantly, to simulate the conditions in 
which a policy maker operates (notice that, for example, when the CCyB is activated, banks 
have a period of one year to meet the new requirement).  
If we introduce the equity ratio in the equation in a linear way and a negative and statistically 
significant sign is found, it could be concluded that the higher the bank capital, the lower the 
credit growth in any state of the nature. However, it could be interesting to check if that 
coefficient is different in stress periods (when credit declines) and in tranquil periods (when 
credit increases). For example, if the coefficient is negative when credit grows and positive 
when credit decline, it could be concluded that the higher the capital ratio the lower the 
volatility of the financial cycle.  
The easy way to check this possible non-linearity consists on identifying, from external 
sources -for example using narrative techniques-, financially stressed and tranquil periods 
and estimate separate coefficients for the equity ratio in both subsamples. This approach may 
be criticized from different angles. First, in order to identify a financial crisis, a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative information is considered, which can be different from one 
paper to another (see, for example, Laeven and Valencia (2008) or Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2013)). Second, usually the number of positive outcomes of the dependent variable (the 
number of systemic crisis) is reduced. In our historic sample we have just 8 systemic crisis, 
but it needs to be acknowledged that in most used samples (luckily) there is no more than 
three episodes. The third possible critic is that this approach does not allow to analyze the 
depth and the duration of the crisis. More importantly, this methodology assumes as given 
the identified systemic crisis. 
A way to solve these problems is to use a Markov-switching regime model (Hamilton, 1989). 
In this class of models the data itself identifies the periods where there is a high probability 
of being in a state of reduced or negative credit growth, that traditionally are linked to 
systemic banking crisis. In fact, a Markov-switching regime model allows the economy to be 
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at different states, where the probability of transition from one state to another is independent 
from the previous states the economy was at. 
In any case, to double check that the real growth of credit is a promising variable for this 
analysis, we run an autorregresive Markov-switching model for this variable considering 
only one explanatory variable, a constant, which can be different in the two states of the 
nature.  
???? ? ?????? ? ???????? ? ??? ?????????????????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ????   
Where ∆ is the differences operator (that would take into account the integration order of the 
variable), lower case letters refer to the log of the variables and CR is real credit. 
Therefore, the constant should capture the conditional average growth rate of real credit in 
every state. Then, we calculate the implicit probabilities of being in the state of the nature 
where credit grows the least, which should correspond to the periods associated with systemic 
banking crisis. 
The time series credit to the non-financial private sector for Spain that we use in this paper 
are taken from the BIS database (1970-to date), which the original source is the country’s 
financial accounts. We use two statistics: total and bank credit. The latter uniquely includes 
bank credit while the former adds all fixed income instruments issued by non-financial 
private companies. These time-series are backtracked until 1880 using the credit aggregate 
generated in the previous section from banks’ balance sheets. We are aware that this is not 
the best way to proceed as these historical aggregate also include the credit to the public 
sector (i.e. it is not possible to disentangle both as we go back in time).   
Figure 4 shows the growth rates of these two variables in real terms (that is, deflated by the 
CPI). The first remark to be done is the similarity between both. Before 1980, the similarity 
is due to the fact that there was very few information on bonds issuance by non-financial 
firms, but even afterwards the profile is very similar. In the second place, they show a notable 
volatility. Growth rates have fluctuated above 40% in absolute value. Third, in all the 
systemic banking crisis periods, a decline in the real growth of credit is observed. This 
suggest this variable is a promising one to capture this kind of events. Further, as it can be 
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seen in the table accompanying Figure 4, the descriptive statistics of both variables measured 
by their mean and standard deviation are very different before and after the Civil War; this 
is remarkable in the case of the volatility, which before the Civil War was almost double than 
afterwards. For this reason, in the empirical section we will check if the results are different 
in both sub-periods.        
Figure 5 shows the main results of the estimation on the simple Markov-switching regime 
model. The result are quite satisfactory. In all the identified crisis using narrative techniques 
the probability of being in the low credit growth regime is 100%. However, the duration of 
the episodes is not always matched (especially in that of mid-seventies) and there is one 
period right after the Civil War where the results of the model are compatible with a stress 
episode which has not been identified as a systemic banking crisis with the narrative 
approach.12  
Thus, the model to be estimated will have the following general form: 
???? ? ?????? ? ???????? ? ????????????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ??????? ?
??????? ? ???????????????????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ????   
Where EQR is the equity ratio, Y is the income, RR the real cost of funds, PRV the colateral 
and ECM the error correction mechanism.13  
Regarding the explanatory variables, it should be taken into account that sometimes it is 
difficult to build the most adequate determinants for this historical sample period. Thus, we 
use real GDP as the scale variable, to capture both income and part of the wealth effects. The 
relative cost of lending is measured with the real interest rate proxied by the nominal yield 
of public debt instruments minus the inflation rate measured by the CPI. Besides, we 
                                                          
12 Regarding the estimation results, of the autoregressive Markov-switching model of credit growth, the 
estimated constant implies that in the stress regimes, total credit declines 2.9% on average per year and 4.4% 
when uniquely bank credit is considered. This could be rationalized as if capital markets were partially 
compensating credit provided by banks during systemic financial crisis. Besides, the expected duration of that 
regime are 6.9 and 6 years, respectively. On the contrary, in the high credit growth regime, the corresponding 
constants are 9% in both cases.     
13 In this expression we only consider two states of the nature and we only allow two parameters to change with 
them. We have chosen this specification after several proofs, trying to retain the most parsimonious result. 
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construct a relative housing price, which is our proxy for the collateral (and part of the wealth) 
behavior.14 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
This model will be estimated in several steps. First, we check the time-series properties of all 
the variables. This will determine the differencing order of the variables to become 
stationary.15 Second, we will check if there exist a cointegration relationship among the 
variables (or a subset of them). If that is the case, in order to obtain consistent estimates of 
the parameters in the stationary specification, it would be necessary to include an additional 
explanatory variable: the deviation of credit from its long run equilibrium (error correction 
term). This deviation captures the convergence to the long-run equilibrium; thus, the 
corresponding coefficient should be negative, statistically significant and smaller than one in 
absolute value. This cointegration relation will be obtained using the fully modified least 
squares estimator, which has proved to have very good properties with such a long time series 
as we have in this case. 16 We prefer this to the alternative of including the lagged levels of 
the relevant variables in the stationary specification and jointly estimate both the long and 
the short run parameters, as in this non-linear environment is preferable to estimating the 
most parsimonious specification possible.  
As it can be seen in Appendix 2, both total and bank credit plus real GDP and the equity ratio 
conform a cointegrating vector. Nevertheless, results are not very robust, probably as a 
consequence of not being able to disaggregate credit to households and to non-financial 
firms. Hence, we do consider it given that the estimated coefficients seem reasonable and in 
line with previous research. The elasticity with respect to the GDP is positive and it is higher 
than the unity, reflecting how wealth effects implied a progressive increase of indebtedness 
already documented in Figure 1. The semielasticity of the equity ratio is negative, thus 
capturing both cost and balance sheet effects. The real interest rate and the housing price are 
not statistically significant, probably due, in the first case, to the fact that in most of the 
                                                          
14 In Appendix 1 we explain the details on how we construct these last two variables.  
15 The details of the time-series characteristics of these variables appear in Appendix 2, where the results of the 
unit-root tests are presented. 
16 In Appendix 2 we show the results of this analysis. 
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sample period nominal interest rates were regulated.17 In the second case, the joint 
consideration of credit to households, for which there is evidence of being relevant, and to 
non-financial private companies, could be the most simple and straightforward explanation, 
although it should be also taken into account that until the Civil War, most of Spanish 
households were renting the houses they lived in. 
An additional difficulty with the estimation process is that the explanatory variables can be 
considered endogenous, as they can be jointly determined with the own credit. In the case of 
the GDP, one of the motivations for this research is the important losses of GDP that usually 
happen during financially stressed episodes; there is evidence that part of those losses are 
due to the supply credit constrains that weak financial institutions apply to the real sector of 
the economy. In the case of the real housing prices, credit conditions also play a very 
important role in determining both the demand of housing services and the supply of new 
houses. Last but not least, the real interest rate is the equilibrium price of the supply and 
demand of credit, so it is clearly endogenous.   
In these circumstances, to obtain consistent estimators for these two variables, it is necessary 
to instrument them or using an adequate lag. The two properties that the instruments should 
fulfill are they to be correlated with the variable to be instrumented and they not to be 
correlated with credit growth. Thus, in the case of GDP growth we have considered three 
instruments capturing demand shocks: world GDP growth, arrivals of tourists and the 
structural public balance. The first two instruments are determined abroad, so they will not 
be affected by Spanish credit conditions; the third one is determined by the public sector, 
which is the producer of the safe asset of the economy, so it should not be affected by 
domestic credit constrains. For the real housing price, we have added a supply side variable, 
the stock of houses per capita. As this variable is predetermined with respect to the prices, as 
most of the houses were built well in advance, it should be a valid instrument.18 Finally, in 
the case of the real interest rates we decided to use its two-period lagged value to solve the 
problem. 
                                                          
17 In fact, this could help explain the sign and statistical significance of the capital ratio, as capital is the most 
costly source of funding for banks. 
18 Appendix 1 details how these instruments were constructed.  
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Thus, we can run regressions of GDP and real housing price growth on these instruments and 
obtain their adjusted values. These adjusted values will substitute the observed values in the 
model credit to obtain consistent estimators of the parameters of interest. As it can be seen 
in Appendix 2, the R2 of these auxiliary regressions is very high, so the instruments are well 
correlated with the instrumented variables.                      
3.3. Comparison with previous econometric approaches 
As it was said in the introduction, the main goal of this paper is to contribute to disentangle 
the role played by banks’ equity in the periods of credit expansion and, more importantly, 
during systemic banking crisis. In that respect, several empirical papers have estimated 
different binary models of probability (logit, probit, etc.) where the variable to be explained 
was the occurrence of a financial crisis. However, contrary to this paper, their aim is to predict 
these events in advance. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Hardy 
and Pazarbasioglu (1998) use multinomial logit models for the prediction of systemic 
banking crisis. More recently, Laina et al. (2015) use univariate signaling and multivariate 
logit models to study different systemic banking crises in the European Union. They show 
that the growth rates of loans-to-deposits and house prices are the best indicators to predict 
systemic banking crisis, followed by the growth rates of mortgages, household loans and 
private loans. In addition, Betz et al. (2014), focusing on the European banking market, state 
that joining both bank-specific and country-level macroeconomic  and financial data such as 
house and stock prices, early-warning models’ predictions of financial crises are greatly 
improved. 
Besides, using the evolution of credit to identify financial stress periods we depart from the 
banking crises literature, which has focused on the role of the evolution of credit anticipate 
financial crises. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study the effect of credit among 
other variables on banking and currency crisis, concluding that credit to the private sector 
accelerates before a banking crisis emerges; Borio and Drehmann (2009) study the 
relationship between credit growth and asset prices to determine the likelihood of a future 
banking crises.  
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In any case, this is not the first time our methodology is used for our purpose at hand. For 
example, Kaufmann and Valderrama (2004) estimate equations of credit to households and 
firms with Markov-switching models and Anguren (2011) built a synthetic indicator of global 
credit stance using the same methodology. However, to our knowledge, this is the first time  
the role that bank equity plays in credit’s evolution along time is studied, connecting with the 
bank capital and credit crunch traditional literature (Bernanke and Lown (1991), Rajan 
(1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995)). At the same time, we also analyze the role of bank 
equity (and debt) on credit from the supply side point of view (i.e. taking into account the 
solvency position of the banks), following a much more recent literature (Jiménez et al (2012, 
2014, 2017) and Gambacorta and Shin (2016))19 where panel data and very granular 
information at the bank or even at loan level is used. However, our historical perspective 
prevents us from engaging in this panel approach because of the lack of granular data. The 
elasticity of credit to bank capital is, of course, a key input for banking regulators as well as 
for policy makers in general.   
4. Results 
Before presenting our estimated model, it is interesting to show the results that we obtain 
when we estimate a more traditional linear credit equation. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 
present this exercise using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable 
techniques (2SLS). As it can be seen, there exists a certain inertia in the evolution of the stock 
of credit, that jointly with the GDP growth, the real housing price and the error correction 
term are the explanatory variables that come out statistically significant. The use of 
instrumental variable techniques does not change much the point estimates, although the 
statistical significance of both GDP growth and real housing prices growth declines. In all 
the cases, the parameter estimated for the ECM fulfills all the requirements to confirm the 
existence of a cointegration relationship, although it implies that the speed of adjustment to 
the long run equilibrium is relatively slow. The real interest rate has the expected sign but it 
is not statistically significant, as it happens with the equity ratio, which, as in the long-run 
estimation, has a negative effect on credit growth. 
                                                          
19 Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014) and Saurina and Shin (2012) stress the importance of analyzing bank leverage 
in order to understand bank behavior during expansions and recessions.  
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Columns 2 and 4 try to check in a simple way if the relationship between credit and its 
determinants differs in tranquil and stress times. We do that introducing a dummy that takes 
the value of one when there has been a systemic banking crisis in Spain according to the 
classification of Martín-Aceña (2013). Therefore, one minus that dummy captures tranquil 
times. Two observations are in order. First, the average growth rate of real credit is higher in 
tranquil times than during systemic banking crisis; however, the coefficients are only 
statistically significant when using instrumental variable technics. And second, when we 
interact the dummy with our variable of interest, the equity ratio, we obtain opposite signs, 
although the parameters are not statistically significant. On the one hand, in tranquil times 
the sign is negative, suggesting that if previously the bank increased its equity ratio, credit 
growth was moderated. On the other hand, the corresponding sign in crisis times is positive, 
so if previously the ratio had increased, credit would grow more (or diminish less). This result 
is very suggestive, as it would imply that the equity ratio could smooth the credit cycle.    
In order to check more formally this asymmetry, we estimate the non-linear model presented 
before, that allows to identify endogenously the different states of the nature. The main 
results appear in Table 2. Columns (1) and (3) present the specification for total and bank 
credit respectively, where only the conditional mean changes with the state. In that 
specification, most of the coefficients are statistically significant and they have the expected 
sign. The growth of the credit stock shows a different mean in both states, presents a certain 
inertia, depends positively on GDP and real housing prices growth (the statistical significance 
of both variables diminishes when instrumented) and the error correction mechanism implies 
a relatively slow speed of adjustment. The real interest rate, as it happened in the linear 
specification, does not play any role. Again, the change in the equity ratio (our variable of 
interest) is negatively signed but it is not statistically significant.20  
In the second specification (columns (2) and (4)) we allow the equity ratio (jointly with the 
constant) to have a non-linear effect on the credit growth. Indeed, this seems to be the case. 
According to our estimates, increasing the equity ratio in advance of a credit boom reduces 
the credit growth, while if it is done in advance of a credit crunch it moderates the expected 
                                                          
20 In the case of the equity ratio, we have considered another stationary transformation as a robustness check of 
the main results: its deviations from a Band-Pass filter trend. The results of this approach are presented in 
Appendix 3. The quantitative results are different, but qualitatively they imply similar conclusions.  
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decline in credit, although the former effect is estimated more imprecisely, mostly when 
instrumental variable techniques are considered. In any case, given the difference in the 
coefficients’ absolute value and in its statistical significance in the short run, even taking into 
account that the equity ratio has a negative effect of credit in the long-run (error correction 
mechanism), it seems that this effect is more powerful during credit crunches. We interpret 
this result as if a countercyclical capital buffer would reduce the size of the expansion and, 
more importantly, the magnitude of the subsequent credit decline.21 And this is exactly what 
a macroprudential tool should do: accumulate in the expansion to be freed in the recession.22 
All the other parameters show the expected sign, although neither the housing price nor the 
real interest rate are statistically significant. As it happened before, the main change in the 
IV estimation is the increase in the elasticity of credit to GDP. 
From a quantitative perspective, the results are very significant. Notice that they imply that 
increasing by one percentage point the equity ratio before an expansionary period reduces 
the credit growth by 0.5 pp. On the contrary, if banks did that in advance of a contractionary 
period, it would reduce the decline rate by more than 10%. This last elasticity is very high. 
Nevertheless, if risk-weighted assets (RWA) are around half of total assets, which is the case 
for Spanish banks, not for other European banking sectors (Trucharte et al 2015), increasing 
by 1 percentage point (pp) the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is akin to increasing 2 
pp the capital in terms of RWA, as current capital requirements are being required. 2 pp 
increase in capital requirement is a very large demand for banks. Given the fact that Basel 3 
has developed a CCyB requirement, with a maximum value at 2.5% of RWA, this is 
equivalent to 1.25% of total assets, if RWA density is 0.5 as stated before. Therefore, the 
impact of reaching a requirement at the maximum of the CCyB during the expansion, should 
allow for a reduction in lending decline, when the CCyB was freed in the recession, of around 
15%, which is very significant, showing the potential impact of countercyclical tools. 
According to the dynamic multipliers (see Figure 6), the maximum effect is reached three 
years after the increase in the equity ratio is recorded, decreasing progressively in the 
                                                          
21 Note that this finding is in line with Jiménez et al. (2017) but considering eight systemic banking crisis and 
close to one and half century time span. 
22 Appendix 3 reproduces Table 2 but using the deviation of the equity ratio with respect to the Band-Pass filter 
trend. Although the results are quantitatively different, they are essentially the same from a qualitative point of 
view.    
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following periods until becoming negative and stabilizing at the estimated long-run elasticity. 
In any case, it is important to realize that the long period analyzed includes severe lending 
booms and busts and a significant volatility in credit growth rates, which may help to explain 
the high value of the elasticity in downturns. 
The estimates also show that the duration of the states are highly asymmetrical. The 
expansionary periods as an average last sixteen years and the contractionary ones three years 
and a half. Therefore, on average in a lending cycle (boom and bust) the elasticity of credit 
to capital altogether would be much closer to other estimates in the literature (Gambacorta 
and Shin (2016)).    
As the variables used in this paper go back more than one hundred years, full homogeneity 
is not guaranteed. Besides, the Spanish financial system has substantially changed and 
relevant regulation has been modified several times. Thus, in order to check results’ 
robustness, we have repeated the estimations of the Markov-switching regime model using 
different sample periods to exclude some of the episodes of systemic banking crisis in order 
to increase homogeneity. In fact, after the loss of Cuba, a significant amount of capital 
returned to Spain from abroad and, partly, was invested in creating new bank houses that 
became large Spanish banks during the XX century (Banco Hispano Americano, Banco 
Español de Crédito and Banco de Vizcaya were created at the turning of the century). 
Other robustness exercises performed consisted on estimating the model before and after the 
Spanish Civil war as we have a gap in the data in such a period. Moreover, this breakdown 
is of interest since, according to figure 4 and the accompanying table, real credit growth was 
much more volatile in the first period than in the second. However, considering that we have 
fully homogenous banking data from 1952 on, we conduct the post-Civil War test using the 
period 1952-2017, given that results are statistically and economically equivalent to those 
obtained when considering the period after the Civil War (1942-2017). 
In Table 3 we show the results of the estimations shown in Table 2 but using different 
samples. That is, we re-estimate the non-linear model, excluding in the first/second and 
fifth/sixth columns the systemic banking crisis happened in the XIX century, whose nature 
may be quite different from those in the XX and XXI centuries. In columns third/fourth and 
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seventh/eighth we have excluded the period following the introduction of the euro currency, 
which represented a major structural change for the Spanish economy, in particular, in terms 
of monetary policy sovereignty; besides, this period includes also the credit boom of early 
2000s and the global financial crisis. 
We obtain similar and comparable results for the two subsamples. In the first case, we 
observe that the average duration of the credit booms is longer, as are the credit crunches; 
and, to some extent, the effect of the equity ratio in booms is higher and similar in busts. In 
the second case, the two relevant differences are that the average duration of credit booms is 
shorter, which seems to be reasonable taking into account that the credit boom that preceded 
the global financial crisis was one of the largest in history. Besides, the elasticity of the equity 
ratio in downturns is higher.  
Table 4 shows other robustness checks considering the pre- and post-Spanish Civil was 
periords separately. The results in the period before the Civil War (columns (1/2) and (5/6)) 
are very similar to those obtained when the full sample is considered. Nevertheless, there are 
some differences worth mentioning. First, credit growth shows less inertia; and second, the 
elasticity to GDP is higher. Finally, in columns (3/4) and (7/8) we use the period for which 
fully homogeneous series for the equity ratio are available after the Civil war. The differences 
now are more relevant. Notice that in this sample we have a fewer number of systemic 
financial crisis (only three) and one of them is of a much higher order of magnitude; thus, it 
is not surprising that the results show more instabilities, being some of them difficult to 
reconcile with the theory or other empirical results .  
We summarize in what follows the most relevant conclusions. First, the inertia is much 
higher, as a consequence of the higher maturity of the credit to the private non-financial 
sector; this is probably related to the expansion of mortgages that followed the access of 
Spanish households to their own house. Second, the sensitiveness of credit to GDP is higher. 
Third, and more importantly, although the equity ratio still has an asymmetric effect on credit 
growth, the parameters change importantly; they diminish considerably in stress periods; in 
fact, this estimated multiplier will imply that, for example, if a credit crunch comes with the 
CCyB full loaded at 2.5% of RWA, credit will diminish by 3% less than if that buffer were 
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not available. In fact, Figure 7 shows how the asymmetry in the dynamic multipliers of credit 
to the equity ratio diminish substantially, but it is still present.     
In this last sample the weight of the so called Great Moderation period and the subsequent 
Great Recession could be very important, thus conditioning most of the results that we obtain. 
Notice that in such period, not only Spain became member of the European Monetary Union; 
further, from the perspective of the financial system, the Spanish banks started to operate in 
other countries and risk weights were introduced to calculate the solvency ratios; besides, 
when the crisis arose, the euro area as a whole was at stake. For these reasons, that crisis 
could have been different. We checked that by estimating the model only for this period 
(1995-2017), although results are not reported given that for that period one unique systemic 
financial crisis is included. However, it is interesting to remark that for this period the GDP 
growth becomes statistically non-significant (obviously, GDP continues being a long-run 
determinant of credit). Further and more importantly, the equity ratio seems to be non-
relevant in the credit bust and bust phases; notice that in this period the Basel accords were 
implemented which implied a difference between the equity ratio and the regulatory capital 
ratio associated to the risk weighted assets. 
5. Conclusions 
One of the lessons learned from the global financial crisis is that we need additional policy 
tools to smooth the credit cycle and reduce the cost that the financial crisis has for taxpayers. 
For those reasons most of the countries have introduced in law code macroprudential tools 
to manage the financial cycle. Although these tools are micro in nature, they have a macro 
aim: to reduce systemic risk. This is a quite new job, and there is not much experience on 
how they work and what their efficiency is. 
Spain, to some extent, is an exception in this respect, as the countercyclical provisions can 
be understood as a macroprudential tool similar to the countercyclical capital buffer.23 
Jiménez et al. (2017) show that these provisions were very effective in smoothing the credit 
crunch during the last crisis and slightly less in curving the credit boom. In this paper we try 
                                                          
23 See Saurina and Trucharte (2017) for a detailed discussion on the potential complement or substitution 
between dynamic provisions and countercyclical capital buffers. 
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to check whether these conclusions can be extended to other financial crisis suffered by the 
Spanish economy. In order to do that, we extend the aggregate information from the banking 
system back to 1880 in order to include eight episodes that, according to Martín-Aceña 
(2013), can be classified as systemic banking crisis.  
The first conclusion from this exercise is that the equity ratio (capital plus reserves over total 
assets) has declined substantially, from figures around 40% at the end of the XIX century to 
almost 4% by 1962 and close to 9% in 2017. This behavior of the Spanish banking system 
has been very similar to that of US and UK, pointing once more towards Spain not being 
different to other countries; that is, in financial terms, Spain has been permeated along time 
by foreign developments.  
Besides, using a non-linear framework, we show that after controlling for the traditional 
determinants of credit to the non-financial private sector, the changes in the equity ratio have 
an asymmetric effect on credit growth. In particular, in the periods when credit growth is 
negative, having increased the equity ratio in advance has an effect on reducing the credit 
decline. On the contrary, in periods when credit growth is positive, having increased the 
equity ratio some years before leads to a moderation of the credit expansion. And this effect 
is qualitatively quite robust in different sub-samples, using different definitions of credit and 
different transformations of the equity ratio.     
We interpret these results as a support for the use of the new macroprudential tools and, 
specially, the countercyclical capital buffer to smooth the financial cycle. This is very much 
in line with the role assigned to bank capital in the traditional credit crunch literature 
(Bernanke and Lown (1991), Rajan (1994) and Peek and Rosengren (1995)). Moreover, our 
findings contribute to explain the determinants of systemic banking crisis as well as 
subsequent business cycle movements (i.e. recessions). It is important to stress the role of 
bank capital as a macroprudential tool to tame the lending cycle or, more realistically, to 
protect from the consequences of lending busts. Our findings complement the more recent 
ones of Gambacorta and Shin (2016), stressing the asymmetric role bank capital plays in 
lending booms and busts, in line also with Saurina and Shin (2012), Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013). 
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Finally, we have provided, apparently for the first time, a long time series of the aggregate 
capital ratio of the Spanish banking sector, spanning close to one century and a half. This 
time-series of the ratio of capital over total assets will certainly be improved along time by 
academic specialists. Our objective here is mainly to spur the debate on this data so that we 
can attract research interest on a crucial variable to understand past and future systemic 
banking crisis. The fact that there are no thorough analysis of this data strikes us. A serious 
effort should be devoted to improve historical banking sector databases, so that we can ask 
crucial questions such as how the implementation of a deposit guarantee scheme soon after 
the return of democracy to Spain may have changed the leverage and the behavior of banks 
and depositors; or the interplay between degree of competition in the banking market and 
incentives of banks to take risk, to protect its franchise with more capital and, in the end, to 
ask for the role bank competition plays in financial stability. These are only two questions of 
the myriad that could be addressed with much more confidence if we had proper databases 
on bank capital, at both aggregate and bank level. 
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Figure 1. Total Assets and Equity over GDP. 1880-2017 
  
Figure 2. Equity over total assets. 1880-2017 
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Figure 3. Equity composition. 1880-2017 
  
Figure 4. Real growth of credit to the non-financial private sector. 1880-2017 
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Table accompanying Figure 4: Descriptive statistics of total and bank credit growth 
  Pre Civil War period Post Civil War period Full sample 
 1880-1935 1942-2017 1880-2017 
  Total credit Bank credit Total credit Bank credit Total credit Bank credit 
Mean 0.043 0.044 0.062 0.062 0.054 0.054 
Std. Dev. 0.149 0.153 0.075 0.084 0.112 0.118 
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Figure 5. Systemic banking crisis and probability of being in the low credit growth 
state. 1880-2017 
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Figure 6. Credit growth dynamic multipliers of the equity ratio. 1880-2017 
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Table 1. Linear credit equation. 1880-2017 
 Total credit Bank credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Constant 0.014 (0.013) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
- - 0.013 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
- - 
Crisis periods - - -0.013 (0.023) 
-0.033 
(0.023) - - 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.034 
(0.024) 
Tranquil periods - - 0.021 (0.017) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
- - 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
Credit growth [-1] 0.280*** (0.079) 
0.277*** 
(0.086) 
0.246*** 
(0.092) 
0.208** 
(0.097) 
0.289*** 
(0.079) 
0.282*** 
(0.086) 
0.257*** 
(0.091) 
0.216** 
(0.097) 
GDP growth 0.666*** (0.247) 
0.610* 
(0.359) 
0.634**  
(0.257) 
0.545 
(0.363) 
0.708*** 
(0.257) 
0.646* 
(0.375) 
0.635** 
(0.267) 
0.582 
(0.378) 
Equity ratio change [-2]  0.035 (0.399) 
0.096 
(0.419) - - 
0.014 
(0.416) 
0.077 
(0.436) - - 
Crisis periods* Equity 
ratio change [-2] 
- - 0.250 
(0.527) 
0.18 
(0.549) 
- - 0.234 
(0.547) 
0.304 
(0.570) 
Tranquil periods* Equity 
ratio change [-2] 
- - 
-0.196 
(0.625) 
-0.066 
(0.652) - - 
-0.233 
(0.648) 
-0.109 
(0.678) 
Real interest rate [-2] -0.103  (0.159) 
-0.163  
(0.167) 
-0.101  
(0.162) 
-0.130  
(0.169) 
-0.109 
(0.166) 
-0.167 
(0.175) 
-0.101 
(0.168) 
-0.136 
(0.176) 
Real housing price 
growth 
0.306*** 
(0.101) 
0.310*  
(0.157) 
0.291*** 
(0.106) 
0.255 
(0.164) 
0.327*** 
(0.106) 
0.354** 
(0.164) 
0.313*** 
(0.111) 
0.298* 
(0.171) 
Residuals of the 
cointegrating vector [-1] 
-0.144*** 
(0.040) 
-0.155*** 
(0.042) 
-0.137*** 
(0.041) 
-0.138*** 
(0.044) 
-0.137*** 
(0.039) 
-0.151*** 
(0.041) 
-0.130*** 
(0.040) 
-0.135*** 
(0.043) 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.215 0.276 0.215 0.301 0.231 0.293 0.233 
Standard deviation 0.088 0.092 0.089 0.093 0.092 0.096 0.092 0.096 
Durbin-Watson 1.868 1.912 1.854 1.865 1.867 1.907 1.850 1.857 
Notes: between parenthesis: standard deviation; between brackets: lags of the variable; *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. Both GDP and housing price growth were instrumented using their own lags and those of credit and interest rate plus 
contemporaneous world GDP growth. 
Figure 7. Credit growth dynamic multipliers of the equity ratio. 1952-2017 
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Table 2. Markov-switching model for credit growth. 1880-2017 
 Total Credit Bank Credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Non-
Instrum. 
Instrum. Non-
Instrum. 
Instrum. Non-
Instrum. 
Instrum. Non-
Instrum. 
Instrum. 
Constant 
-0.225*** 
(0.045) 
-0.234*** 
(0.047) 
-0.024 
(0.024) 
-0.029 
(0.029) 
-0.236*** 
(0.048) 
-0.245*** 
(0.051) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
-0.028 
(0.027) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Credit growth [-1] 
0.256*** 
(0.071) 
0.249*** 
(0.080) 
0.376*** 
(0.078) 
0.373*** 
(0.085) 
0.273*** 
(0.071) 
0.262*** 
(0.080) 
0.394*** 
(0.071) 
0.390*** 
(0.078) 
GDP growth 0.492** 
(0.240) 
0.363 
(0.334) 
0.545*** 
(0.201) 
0.483* 
(0.292) 
0.517** 
(0.246) 
0.382 
(0.350) 
0.582*** 
(0.199) 
0.590* 
(0.291) 
Equity ratio change [-2] -0.051 
(0.406) 
-0.125 
(0.386) 
11.994*** 
(1.566) 
12.597*** 
(1.653) -0.106 
(0.410) 
-0.161 
(0.399) 
12.365*** 
(1.521) 
13.005*** 
(1.626) 
-0.545 
(0.334) 
-0.497 
(0.349) 
-0.602* 
(0.328) 
-0.551 
(0.344) 
Real interest rate [-2] -0.013 
(0.151) 
-0.050 
(0.160) 
-0.030 
(0.142) 
-0.048 
(0.154) 
0.018 
(0.154) 
-0.063 
(0.167) 
-0.037 
(0.139) 
-0.062 
(0.150) 
Real housing price 
growth 
0.308*** 
(0.098) 
0.325** 
(0.150) 
0.217** 
(0.085) 
0.200 
(0.130) 
0.336*** 
(0.099) 
0.376** 
(0.159) 
0.235*** 
(0.086) 
0.230* 
(0.130) 
Residuals of the 
cointegrating vector [-1] 
-0.128*** 
(0.036) 
-0.132*** 
(0.038) 
-0.111*** 
(0.035) 
-0.115*** 
(0.037) 
-0.123*** 
(0.035) 
-0.131*** 
(0.037) 
-0.109*** 
(0.032) 
-0.117*** 
(0.034) 
Log(sigma) -2.626*** 
(0.075) 
-2.578*** 
(0.075) 
-2.711*** 
(0.069) 
-2.665*** 
(0.070) 
-
2.5579*** 
(0.072) 
-2.530*** 
(0.075) 
-2.673*** 
(0.066) 
-2.625*** 
(0.066) 
Probability of remaining 
in state 1  0.222 0.239 0.743 0.727 0.223 0.233 0.745 0.723 
Probability of remaining 
in state 2  0.971 0.970 0.940 0.942 0.972 0.972 0.937 0.938 
Expected duration of state 
1  1.29 
1.31 3.89 3.66 1.29 1.30 3.93 3.61 
Expected duration of state 
2  33.99 
33.85 16.786 17.36 35.80 35.44 15.77 16.04 
Standard deviation 0.089 0.094 0.142 0.146 0.093 0.098 0.147 0.151 
Log-likelihood 137.521 131.442 147.287 141.313 132.073 126.022 142.269 136.112 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.922 1.941 2.347 2.312 1.924 1.940 2.356 2.323 
Notes: See previous table. When there is a split of a variable in two rows, the values of the first row parameters pertain to the low credit 
growth episode (numbers in cursive) while the values of the second row pertain to the high credit growth episode.  
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Table 3. Markov-switching model for credit growth. Robustness analysis (1) 
 Total Credit Bank Credit 
Sample Period 1898-2017 1880-1998 1898-2017 1880-1998 
 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Constant 
-0.047 
(0.043) 
-0.062 
(0.045) 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
-0.003 
(0.032) 
-0.038 
(0.024) 
-0.054* 
(0.032) 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.023* 
(0.014) 
0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
Credit growth [-1] 0.384*** (0.084) 
0.376*** 
(0.091) 
0.297*** 
(0.080) 
0.282*** 
(0.085) 
0.404*** 
(0.068) 
0.396*** 
(0.074) 
0.290*** 
(0.075) 
0.328*** 
(0.100) 
GDP growth 0.678*** 
(0.221) 
0.622* 
(0.321) 
0.629*** 
(0.229) 
0.487* 
(0.291) 
0.737*** 
(0.216) 
0.653** 
(0.307) 
0.665*** 
(0.217) 
0.455 
(0.285) 
Equity ratio change [-2] 
11.585*** 
(1.363) 
12.207*** 
(1.540) 
13.588*** 
(2.265) 
15.207*** 
(2.614) 
11.793*** 
(1.429) 
12.516*** 
(1.495) 
13.991*** 
(2.154) 
12.863*** 
(1.836) 
-1.568 
(1.049) 
-1.536 
(1.094) 
-0.347 
(0.351) 
-0.294 
(0.365) 
-1.796** 
(0.759) 
-1.713** 
(0.780) 
-0.356 
(0.341) 
-0.423 
(0.382) 
Real interest rate [-2] 0.121 
(0.189) 
0.150 
(0.190) 
-0.037 
(0.153) 
-0.089 
(0.166) 
0.077 
(0.151) 
0.110 
(0.165) 
-0.043 
(0.149) 
-0.074 
(0.175) 
Real housing price 
growth 
0.150** 
(0.068) 
0.134 
(0.091) 
0.251** 
(0.101) 
0.258* 
(0.148) 
0.169** 
(0.081) 
0.166 
(0.124) 
0.263*** 
(0.099) 
0.230 
(0.148) 
Residuals of the 
cointegrating vector [-1] 
-0.104** 
(0.046) 
-0.107** 
(0.044) 
-0.160*** 
(0.045) 
-0.161*** 
(0.049) 
-0.109*** 
(0.032) 
-0.115*** 
(0.035) 
-0.157*** 
(0.041) 
-0.114** 
(0.045) 
Log(sigma) -2.798*** 
(0.142) 
-2.753*** 
(0.134) 
-2.659*** 
(0.077) 
-2.614*** 
(0.079) 
-2.754*** 
(0.070) 
-2.701*** 
(0.070) 
-2.629*** 
(0.073) 
-2.572*** 
(0.074) 
Probability of remaining 
in state 1  0.763 0.766 0.679 0.552 0.752 0.750 0.684 0.723 
Probability of remaining 
in state 2  0.950 0.958 0.922 0.904 0.935 0.950 0.921 0.933 
Expected duration of state 
1  4.22 4.27 
3.12 2.23 4.03 4.00 3.17 3.62 
Expected duration of state 
2  20.20 23.68 
12.84 10.41 15.47 19.90 12.60 14.96 
Standard deviation 0.082 0.086 0.154 0.149 0.085 0.090 0.159 0.156 
Log-likelihood 138.127 132.519 119.521 112.383 131.927 125.962 114.943 109.216 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.132 2.093 2.300 2.249 2.134 2.102 2.302 2.305 
Notes: see previous table. 
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Table 4. Markov-switching model for credit growth. Robustness analysis (2) 
 Total Credit Bank Credit 
Sample Period 1880-1935 1952-2017 1880-1935 1952-2017 
 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Constant 
-0.008 
(0.066) 
-0.038 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.009 
(0.067) 
-0.039 
(0.055) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.072** 
(0.044) 
0.078** 
(0.040) 
0.015 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.074 
(0.046) 
0.080** 
(0.041) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
Credit growth [-1] 0.246* (0.149) 
0.215 
(0.132) 
0.490*** 
(0.140) 
0.637*** 
(0.127) 
0.248* 
(0.150) 
0.216* 
(0.131) 
0.486*** 
(0.076) 
0.607*** 
(0.137) 
GDP growth 0.773 
(0.497) 
0.799 
(0.512) 
0.809*** 
(0.248) 
0.814** 
(0.396) 
0.801 
(0.510) 
0.830 
(0.524) 
0.972*** 
(0.209) 
0.816* 
(0.448) 
Equity ratio change [-2] 
11.632** 
(5.903) 
8.993*** 
(3.294) 
1.481 
(2.173) 
2.660** 
(1.252) 
11.893* 
(6.105) 
9.275*** 
(3.351) 
4.020 
(3.796) 
2.710* 
(1.313) 
-0.599 
(0.505) 
-0.416 
(0.498) 
0.393 
(1.519) 
-0.417 
(1.517) 
-0.516 
(0.517) 
-0.430 
(0.510) 
-0.289 
(0.990) 
-1.247 
(2.555) 
Real interest rate [-2] -0.514 
(0.427) 
-0.461 
(0.381) 
-0.331** 
(0.163) 
-0.168 
(0.159) 
-0.532 
(0.440) 
-0.479 
(0.390) 
-0.500*** 
(0.170) 
-0.197 
(0.189) 
Real housing price 
growth 
0.660* 
(0.339) 
0.468 
(0.343) 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
-0.006 
(0.159) 
0.672* 
(0.373) 
0.473 
(0.346) 
0.175*** 
(0.058) 
0.049 
(0.192) 
Residuals of the 
cointegrating vector [-1] 
-0.224** 
(0.103) 
-0.218** 
(0.087) 
-0.092 
(0.083) 
-0.081** 
(0.041) 
-0.223** 
(0.102) 
-0.218** 
(0.086) 
-0.086*** 
(0.030) 
-0.090** 
(0.043) 
Log(sigma) -2.390*** 
(0.134) 
-2.390*** 
(0.121) 
-3.619*** 
(0.174) 
-3.421*** 
(0.114) 
-2.365*** 
(0.134) 
-2.366*** 
(0.120) 
-3.504*** 
(0.104) 
-3.312*** 
(0.131) 
Probability of remaining 
in state 1  0.565 0.813 0.924 0.887 0.569 0.814 0.976 0.854 
Probability of remaining 
in state 2  0.918 0.947 0.967 0.924 0.918 0.948 0.909 0.958 
Expected duration of state 
1  2.30 5.35 
13.07 8.62 2.32 5.39 41.89 6.66 
Expected duration of state 
2  12.14 19.22 
29.87 12.68 12.14 19.26 11.02 23.72 
Standard deviation 0.153 0.134 0.031 0.036 0.157 0.137 0.035 0.041 
Log-likelihood 42.939 42.934 138.516 128.155 41.602 41.626 129.364 118.713 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.136 2.070 1.572 1.468 2.140 2.074 1.655 1.496 
Notes: see previous tables. 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources 
Given the long period of time analyzed in the paper, we have had to use several databases. 
These databases are not always compatible among them and cover different time periods. In 
what follows we explain how we have handled the data and identify its sources. 
We obtain Spanish macroeconomic information from a publicly available database owned 
and managed by Banco de España. We also obtain aggregated balance sheet information for 
the financial entities located and operating in Spain from a publicly accessible database of 
Banco de España, and we focus on commercial and savings banks. Data about banks’ 
statistics is provided at a monthly basis since 1962. We uniquely employ the values regarding 
December of each year and the last year we consider for computational purposes is 2017. 
Due to data constrains about banks’ balance sheet information prior to 1962, data regarding 
that time period is not as disaggregated as the data available after 1962. Thus, we aggregate 
balance sheets’ items from 1962 on in order to create a simplified or reduced balance sheet 
consistent with the balance sheets’ entries prior to 1962. This way, as it is mentioned in the 
main text, the balance sheet entries we end up with using for the entire time period under 
consideration are the following: total assets and liabilities, total credit awarded to the private 
and public sector, deposits and capital and reserves. The last two items we group them for 
the purpose of the paper under the term equity. 
Unfortunately, as we go back in time, it is not possible to disentangle credit to private and 
public sectors although, as we argue in the paper, that is not a significant drawback for the 
purposes of our research. 
Banks’ balance sheet information before 1962 is obtained from several Statistical Bulletins 
of Banco de España and form Bank Bulletins of the Spanish Banking Association, where the 
Spanish economy’s aggregate financial information is provided up to 1925. This information 
is available uniquely in hard paper and it is manually digitalized by the authors. 
Besides, in order to maximize the time length of available information, we use two books 
which provide Spanish banks’ balance sheet information back until 1856. However, given 
that the Banco de España obtained the monopoly of currency issuance in 1874, we focus our 
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study from 1880 till 2017. That is, we exclude the relatively short period of time (e.g. less 
than a quarter of a century) where several banks had the privilege to issue currency, which 
may have a totally different impact in the incentives the banks had to raise equity and in the 
relationship between equity and credit provided to customers.  
The first book, entitled "Estadísticas históricas de España volumen II, siglos XIX-XX" by 
Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (2005), provides Spanish financial institutions’ main 
balance sheet entries from the year 1856 until 2000, in an annual basis, excluding the 
information for the period concerning the Spanish Civil War (information not available from 
1936 to 1941).  
The second book we employ is entitled "La banca española en la Restauración II, datos para 
una historia económica", published by the research department of Banco de España in 1974, 
and it provides Spanish most important private banks’ balance sheet information between 
1874 and 1914. This source does not provide aggregated statistics about the Spanish overall 
banking system, but it does provide Spanish most important banks’ balance sheet 
information, aggregated by regions. During the time covered by the book, the most important 
private commercial banks were headquartered in Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
so the book provides the aggregated balance sheets of the entities located in those regions. 
We sum up all available banks’ balance sheet entries’ information to end up with all the 
Spanish most important private banks’ balance sheet information. 
As it is explained in the main text, the aggregate balance sheets of these different databases 
are not exactly the same, so we had to link them using a purely statistical approach. We 
assume that the higher the aggregation level of the balance sheet the higher the precission of 
the information. Thus we enlarged backwards total assets from the most recent database using 
the corresponding growth rates of the older databases. In the case of the different items on 
the balance sheet, we use the older databases growth rates but we introduced an adjustment 
in the different assets and liabilities entries to guarantee that they added up.  
Therefore, to assess the validity of this approach, it is necessary to check if the growth rates 
of the different databases in the common years are similar. We do that for the most relevant 
items in Figures A.1.1 to A.1.3 (the rest are available upon request). Both in the case of total 
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assets and credit there seems to be a high coherence between the first three databases, not 
being possible to evaluate the fourth one due to the lack of a common sample. In the case of 
the equity ratio, the main discrepancy appears to be in the Martín-Aceña time series, although 
this is probably a consequence of not including the reserves in the equity. 
Figure A.1.1. Annual variation rate of total assets, by source 
 
Figure A.1.2. Annual variation rate of total credit, by source 
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Figure A.1.3. Evolution of the equity ratio, by source 
 
We also use the growth rates exposed in the book by Carreras and Tafunell (2005) to 
backtrack the Spanish GDP, inflation (CPI), the nominal interest rate (corresponding to 
public debt instruments), the housing price (using the evolution of prices implicit in the 
property register statistics), general government balance, number of houses built (this 
variable is crucial to construct an indicator of the stock of houses in Spain for the entire period 
we consider, combining it with Census data) and population. The most modern part of these 
statistics is obtained from the publicly available database at the Banco de España. Finally, 
the time series of total and bank credit to the non-financial sector is backtracked using the 
regression coefficients in the common period with our series of total credit described before 
(the R2 of these regressions was 0.94).  
Even if the majority of the information is directly available in pesetas, we convert all values 
to euros according to the official exchange rate (1 euro = 166.386 pesetas) and work with 
values expressed in thousands of euros. The loss of precision for doing so is minimal and 
thus it is disregarded. 
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Appendix 2. Unit roots, cointegration tests and instrument validity  
The first part of this appendix presents the results obtained from the traditional unit root tests 
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF) applied to the seven variables considered in this paper. 
This is a crucial step to decide the number of differences that every variable requires in order 
to be considered stationary. As it can be seen in Table A.2.1, all the variables apart from the 
real interest rate seem to be integrated of first order. That is, it is the first difference 
transformation what makes them become stationary. The level of the real interest rate is 
stationary, provided that both nominal interest rate and inflation are integrated of first order 
and they conform a cointegration vector with a -1 coefficient.       
Table A.2.1. Unit root tests. 1880-2017 
 H0: First difference of the 
variable has an unit root 
H0: The level of the 
variable has an unit root 
 ADF 
Critical 
Value (1%) 
P-
value 
ADF Critical 
Value (1%) 
P-
value 
Equity ratio -12.416 -2.583 0.000 -1.948 -3.482 0.310 
Log of total credit to the private non-
financial sector 
-8.351 -3.482 0.000 -2.749 -4.031 0.219 
Log of bank credit to the private non-
financial sector 
-8.053 -3.482 0.000 -2.769 -4.031 0.212 
Log of GDP -8.811 -3.479 0.000 -1.970 -4.027  0.612 
Nominal interest rate -12.106 -2.583 0.000 -0.853 -2.583  0.345 
Inflation -13.715 -2.582 0.000 -2.437 -3.481 0.134 
Real interest rate -13.292 -2.583 0.000 -6.536 -3.481 0.000 
Log of real housing price -5.910 -3.480 0.000 -2.493 -4.027 0.331 
ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
Therefore, we now check if there exists at least a cointegrating vector among each credit 
definition and GDP, real housing price and the equity ratio. As it can be seen in the first two 
columns of Table A.2.2, in the case of total credit, the GDP and the relative housing prices, 
they are not enough to conform a cointegrating vector (jointly with the real interest rate, 
which is a stationary variable). In fact, housing prices enter with an unexpected negative sign 
although they are not statistically significant, while the GDP is positively signed and very 
significant. Its elasticity is higher than the unity, which captures the how the progressive 
development of Spanish economy and its financial sector has implied an upward trend to 
higher indebtedness already pointed out in Figure 1. In column (3), when we also consider 
the equity ratio, its coefficient is negative and statistically significant, thus implying that, by 
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increasing this ratio, a moderation in indebtedness should be expected. In this specification 
neither the real interest rate nor the real housing price are statistically significant. In the case 
of the housing price, it should be taken into account that credit to households represents less 
than 50% of total credit in the period when we have that disaggregation. Previously, as banks 
were basically focused on lending to firms, funding their investments behind the economic 
development of the country, that percentage must have been much lower, not to mention the 
fact that income and wealth were much lower for ample segments of the population which 
prevented the development of household banking products, in particular of the asset side of 
the bank balance sheet (i.e. credit). In the case of the real interest rate, the reduction of the 
coefficient in absolute value means that the equity ratio, apart from balance sheet effects, is 
also capturing the cost of lending channel, as nominal interest rates were fixed by the 
authorities for most of the period considered.  
Once we get rid of the non-significant variables in this regression by not including them in 
the regression shown in column (4), a kind of cointegration relation is found.    
Table A.2.2. Cointegration tests (FMLS). 1880-2017 
 Total credit Bank credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 
8.085*** 
(0.263) 
7.103*** 
(1.671) 
8.071*** 
(1.231) 
9.281*** 
(0.292) 
7.552***
(0.284) 
6.720*** 
(1.807) 
7.769*** 
(1.331) 
8.851*** 
(0.315) 
Log of GDP 
1.921*** 
(0.046) 
2.068*** 
(0.248) 
1.931*** 
(0.183) 
1.751*** 
(0.047) 
1.951***
(0.049) 
2.076***
(0.269) 
1.927*** 
(0.198) 
1.766*** 
(0.052) 
Real interest 
rate 
-1.676* 
(0.983) 
-1.640 
(1.011) 
-0.170  
(0.761) 
- -1.870* 
(1.061) 
-1.766 
(1.093) 
-0.171 
(0.823) 
- 
Log of real 
housing price 
- 
-0.072 
(0.123) 
-0.087 
(0.092) 
- - -0.061 
(0.133) 
-0.076 
(0.100) 
- 
Equity ratio - - 
-2.333*** 
(0.430) 
-2.390*** 
(0.423) - - 
-2.535*** 
(0.465) 
-2.611*** 
(0.455) 
Adjusted R2 0.983 0.983 0.991 0.991 0.981 0.981 0.990 0.990 
E-G tau-
statistic 
-2.673 
[0.400] 
-2.640 
[0.609] 
-3.568 
[0.312] 
-3.571 
[0.086] 
-2.532 
[0.472] 
-2.495 
[0.680] 
-3.500 
[0.343] 
-3.509 
[0.098] 
E-G z-statistic 
-13.623 
[0.375] 
-12.979 
[0.621] 
-27.557 
[0.165] 
-27.424 
[0.031] 
-12.645 
[0.429] 
-11.864 
[0.685] 
-26.631 
[0.189] 
-26.698 
[0.036] 
t-ECM -0.104 [0.009] 
-0.0911 
[0.009] 
-0.167 
[0.001] 
-0.165 
[0.001] 
-0.0971 
[0.013] 
-0.091 
[0.014] 
-0.158 
[0.001] 
-0.158 
[0.001] 
Between parenthesis: standard deviation; between brackets: p-value; *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
We have repeated this exercise for bank credit, and given the similarity between both 
definitions of credit, it is not surprising that the results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
very similar (columns 5 to 8). Again, it is necessary to add the equity ratio to the regression 
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of credit over GDP to obtain a cointegration relation and neither the real interest rate nor the 
relative housing price seem to be statistically significant.   
Finally, we present in this section the econometric results that we obtain in the first stage of 
the two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure that we applied in some of the regressions. As 
we said in the main text, the two variables that can be considered endogenous are the 
contemporaneous growth of GDP and real housing prices. In the first case, it is well 
established both theoretically and empirically that credit conditions are very relevant to 
determine not only private consumption and investment but also external trade, influencing 
therefore private demand and GDP in the short term. In the second case, the interrelation run 
through housing investment and thus on prices for a given stock of houses that changes very 
slowly.     
Table A.2.3. First stage 2SLS procedure. 1880-2017 
 GDP growth Real housing price 
growth 
Constant 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
World GDP growth 
0.477*** 
(0.0719) 
. 
Tourist entrances growth [-1] 
0.036*** 
(0.011) - 
Fiscal impulse 
-0.991*** 
(0.128) - 
Housing stock (-1) - 
-5.916** 
(2.291) 
Housing stock (-2) - 
6.134*** 
(2.318) 
GDP growth [-1] - 
0.347** 
(0.144) 
Real housing price growth [-1] 
0.117*** 
(0.023) 
0.632*** 
(0.064) 
Inflation [-1] 
0.092* 
(0.048) 
- 
Inflation [-2] 
-0.114** 
(0.048) - 
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.523 
Standard deviation 0.023 0.064 
Between parenthesis: standard deviation; *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.      
Given the time span of this study, it is very difficult to get appropriate instruments for these 
two variables. However, we are able to construct several variables capturing exogenous 
demand pressures which are adequate to instrument GDP growth in a credit growth 
regression. In the external front we consider a world GDP by weighting the GDP growth of 
US, UK, France and Italy; and we also use tourist entrances. In the domestic front, the fiscal 
impulse is constructed from a structural public balance calculated by cleaning the public 
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balance from the effect of the output gap (obtained applying an HP filter on GDP); notice 
that a positive value implies a negative demand shock. These variables and its first lags plus 
the first and second lags of GDP growth, real housing prices growth and inflation constituted 
the instruments used in Table A.2.3 for GDP. As can be seen, retaining only the variables 
that were statistically significant, it seems that both the external and the domestic demand 
shocks are significant and have the expected sign; besides, lagged real housing prices growth, 
and inflation are also relevant. For the real housing price, we consider an additional 
instrument: the per capita housing stock, which should capture supply side effects in the 
residential market. In this case, the best predictors are lagged GDP growth, real housing price 
growth and two lags of the changes in the per capita housing stocks. Although in both 
regressions the R2 is quite high -taking into account the long period considered-, we always 
present the 2SLS results jointly with those of OLS to assess the impact of endogeneity. 
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Appendix 3. The role of the equity ratio using other stationary transformation 
An additional robustness check of the results consists on considering a different stationary 
transformation of the equity ratio and repeat the non-linear regressions presented in the main 
text. In particular, we eliminate the non-stationary part of the equity ratio by calculating its 
deviation from a Band-Pass filter. This filter is commonly used in economy to obtain the 
trend and, therefore, the non-stationary part of any variable. That trend is calculated by doing 
symmetric centered moving averages of the observed variable, with a length span of between 
2 and 8 years. Obviously, the interpretation of the equity ratio parameter is different, as it 
reflects whether the equity ratio is above (positive) or below (negative) the trend level, 
instead of the increase/decrease of the equity ratio that we have included in the main text. 
Table A.3.1 shows that the results are qualitatively the same and our main result with respect 
to the asymmetry of the equity ratio during credit booms and busts is retained. 
Table A.3.1. Markov-switching model for credit growth. 1880-2017 
 Total Credit Bank Credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Non-
Instrum. Instrum. 
Constant 
-0.252*** 
(0.041) 
-0.241*** 
(0.043) 
-0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.101** 
(0.048) 
-0.265*** 
(0.043) 
-0.250** 
(0.046) 
-0.048 
(0.031) 
-0.096** 
(0.047) 
0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.024 
(0.013) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.013) 
Credit growth [-1] 
0.292*** 
(0.071) 
0.314*** 
(0.078) 
0.263*** 
(0.077) 
0.256*** 
(0.077) 
0.310*** 
(0.070) 
0.330*** 
(0.078) 
0.286*** 
(0.076) 
0.273** 
(0.074) 
GDP growth 0.457** 
(0.245) 
0.307 
(0.322) 
0.541** 
(0.220) 
0.379 
(0.314) 
0.475* 
(0.247) 
0.324 
(0.339) 
0.575*** 
(0.218) 
0.412 
(0.311) 
Cyclical component of 
the equity ratio [-2] 
-0.447** 
(0.188) 
-0.515*** 
(0.194) 
10.204*** 
(2.021) 
12.922*** 
(4.107) -0.482** 
(0.196) 
-0.552*** 
(0.203) 
10.738*** 
(2.060) 
13.816*** 
(4.011) 
-0.459** 
(0.192) 
-0.493** 
(0.193) 
-0.499*** 
(0.192) 
-0.532*** 
(0.192) 
Real interest rate [-2] 0.072 
(0.138) 
0.064 
(0.142) 
0.010 
(0.141) 
-0.034 
(0.151) 
0.071 
(0.142) 
0.061 
(0.151) 
0.003 
(0.142) 
-0.037 
(0.148) 
Real housing price 
growth 
0.282*** 
(0.102) 
0.262* 
(0.138) 
0.304*** 
(0.094) 
0.325** 
(0.140) 
0.310*** 
(0.100) 
0.304^** 
(0.147) 
0.324*** 
(0.095) 
0.367*** 
(0.140) 
Residuals of the 
cointegrating vector [-1] 
-0.132*** 
(0.035) 
-0.137*** 
(0.037) 
-0.147*** 
(0.043) 
-0.140*** 
(0.037) 
-0.128*** 
(0.034) 
-0.136*** 
(0.036) 
-0.138*** 
(0.037) 
-0.141*** 
(0.034) 
Log(sigma) -2.647*** 
(0.072) 
-2.611*** 
(0.072) 
-2.629*** 
(0.071) 
-2.616*** 
(0.072) 
-2.600*** 
(0.070) 
-2.564*** 
(0.072) 
-2.584*** 
(0.068) 
-2.571*** 
(0.068) 
Probability of remaining 
in state 1  0.213 0.222 0.779 0.655 0.213 0.217 0.751 0.639 
Probability of remaining 
in state 2  0.962 0.967 0.944 0.964 0.963 0.968 0.934 0.959 
Expected duration of state 
1  1.27 
1.29 4.51 2.90 1.27 1.28 4.02 2.77 
Expected duration of state 
2  26.11 
30.42 17.74 27.73 27.17 31.14 15.10 24.36 
Standard deviation 0.094 0.093 0.325 0.102 0.097 0.097 0.331 0.109 
Log-likelihood 138.360 135.124 141.978 138.891 132.958 129.712 136.681 133.514 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.911 2.018 2.175 1.803 1.923 2.023 2.177 1.765 
 Notes: see previous tables         
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